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Abstract 
Understanding why consumers fall prey to fraud and scams is a critically 
important area of research. Yet few comprehensive models of fraud victimization 
exist. The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986) is a possible exception (e.g., Rusch, 1999; Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; 
Lea et al., 2009), but the predictions of ELM remain to be empirically tested in a 
fraud-related decision context. Here, four experiments testing the predictions of 
ELM in a predatory student lending scenario are presented. Although results only 
partially supported the predictions of ELM, it is suggested that ELM can continue 
to serve as a useful framework to better understand consumers’ vulnerability to 
fraud. With 44 million student loan borrowers in the U.S. today owing a collective 
$1.48 trillion, it is critical that research continues to focus on better understanding 
disadvantageous decision-making in this context.  
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Introduction 
Imagine you are a hopeful first-generation college student. You have 
overcome many obstacles and worked very hard to get to this point. You know 
how proud your family members would be to say that their child, grandchild or 
sibling is going to college. However, you will need to take out student loans and 
you feel hesitant about taking on debt. During your visit to a local college, you 
meet with the campus financial aid representative. The representative is very nice, 
but your conversation with her moves quickly and suddenly she is going over the 
details of a private loan. The monthly payment on the loan is significant. You 
begin mentally adding this amount up with your other expected monthly expenses 
when the representative interrupts your train of thought. The representative says, 
“Don’t worry! This degree is in such high demand today, you’ll never have a 
problem finding a job. Companies are always very eager to employee our 
graduates because of the unique training curriculum we provide. Trust me, you’ll 
be making so much money after you graduate you’ll be laughing at that monthly 
payment!”. You ask if you can review the terms of the loan again. The financial 
aid representative tells you that she’s sorry, but she’s extremely busy and has 
another student waiting outside. You think about your family. You think about a 
$100,000 salary. You trust the representative and decide that she is right; taking 
on a little debt is well worth the trade-off to have a degree from a well-respected 
university that will assuredly lead to a great job and salary. You sign the loan.  
Now imagine yourself ten years later. You owe nearly one hundred 
thousand dollars in student loan payments and are making only $30,000 per year. 
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Your loans have gone into default, destroying your credit in the process, making it 
nearly impossible to get approved for a mortgage or auto loan. You look back and 
realize that the job offers, impressive salary and “laughable monthly payment” 
you were once assured of were nothing more than words. You feel angry at that 
financial aid representative, but you are also angry at yourself. How could you 
have let this happen? 
Sadly, this nightmare scenario is a reality for tens of thousands of students 
who attend for-profit colleges. Personal testimonies written by former students as 
part of a lawsuit filed against ITT Technical Institute (Villalba et al. v. ITT 
Educational Services, Inc.) reveal extreme levels of coercion and deceit on the 
part of university recruiters and financial aid representatives. To persuade 
students to take out severely disadvantageous high and variable rate loans, ITT 
Tech personnel deliberately misrepresented the quality of their instructors and 
curriculum, inflated job statistics and expected earnings, downplayed debt burden, 
and rushed prospective students through loan documents to prevent them from 
asking too many questions (Harvard Law, 2018). As several former ITT Tech 
students describe, 
“While I was on the campus tour, I met with several different people, one 
of them being the director of career services. Her name was Darlene and 
she told me many people find jobs in their field before they graduate. I 
was already on board with joining [after that]. She said, ‘you could earn 
upwards of 50,000 dollars a year and that's only with an Associate’s 
Degree’.” 
“When reviewing my finances and paperwork with the advisors, they 
always spoke in a sped-up manor, gliding over all the major details about 
money and payment. Always with an overly positive attitude, like paying 
back an extremely large amount of money wouldn't be hard in the 
slightest.” 
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“I was rushed into completing all sorts of paperwork to apply for Federal 
and Private grants and loans. The interest rate was through the roof, but 
they made it out that once you have this so-called job, you’ll be able to 
make these enormous payments”. 
 
These predatory tactics had devastating and long-lasting effects on victims’ 
financial and mental well-being. In contrast to the secure jobs, large salaries and 
desirable lifestyles they were assured of, years later, former ITT Tech students 
found themselves broke, depressed and desperate for help: 
“I have had many sleepless night pondering what I’m going to do. The 
future I had believed in so badly was attainable now that I received a 
degree, that would open so many doors; proved to be false on so many 
levels. The fact I had put my mother into debt for a loan only gave me even 
worse stress and I contemplated suicide in order for my debt I would be 
unable to pay off to be erased so she can survive.” 
“I am stressed and depressed because of the burden these loans have 
placed on myself and my family. I have no employable skills from ITT 
Tech and do not make enough to make even the minimum payment.” 
“It’s crushing. I fought my way out of debt a few years back and didn’t 
have much but I got clear. Part of that was having to file bankruptcy and it 
was such a relief. I vowed I would never get under so much pressure 
again, which is why I no longer have credit cards. But here I am, 
worthless degree, no job prospects, working two jobs just to make ends 
meet. They’ve pretty much ruined my chance for a decent future.” 
 
Sadly, the accusations of misinformation, misrepresentation and deception 
raised against ITT Tech are not an anomaly. Various other for-profit colleges 
including Corinthian Colleges, Bridgepoint Education Services and American 
Career Institute have also been sanctioned by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau and U.S. Department of Education for predatory lending practices. 
Furthermore, of the nearly 100,000 borrower defense claims (i.e., applications for 
loan relief) submitted to the Department of Education by students who claim they 
were defrauded by federally approved colleges and universities, 98.6% were 
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found to have been filed by attendees of for-profit colleges (Cao & Habash, 
2017).  
It may seem incomprehensible that so many young people could fail to 
ignore the severely disadvantageous terms associated with a proffered loan and be 
persuaded to sign the loan on the spot, without thinking more deeply about the 
decision. However, these behaviors are consistent with the predictions of the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows: first, the predictions of 
ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and previous empirical research illustrating these 
predictions will be described. Next, a theoretical application of ELM’s predictions 
to the ITT Tech case will be proposed. Four experiments empirically testing the 
predictions of ELM in a fictional predatory student lending scenario 
(representative of the ITT Tech case) will then be presented and the results will be 
described, followed by a discussion of the implications of this research, its 
limitations, and possibilities for future directions. 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (ELM; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) is a dual process theory that posits there are two cognitive routes 
to persuasion: the central route and the peripheral route. Under the central route, 
persuasion results from a person’s deliberate and effortful consideration of 
information and the merit associated with that information (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). In contrast, persuasion under the peripheral route can result even without a 
person’s effortful scrutiny of information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The 
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peripheral route is associated with a person’s use of simple, less effortful 
cognitive strategies to inform their evaluations of information quality such as 
heuristics, positive/negative cue associations, or even their general feeling or 
impressions toward the information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
According to ELM, the extent to which someone elaborates on 
information (i.e., thinks about) and thus the route they use (i.e., central versus 
peripheral) is related to two factors: the person’s motivation and their ability. 
Motivation is related to the relevance or importance of a message to a listener 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The more a person is interested in, feels connected to 
or perceives that information is relevant to them, the more likely they will be to 
think deeply about and carefully evaluate that information (i.e., engage in central 
processing; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In contrast, when someone perceives 
information to be uninteresting or irrelevant to them (i.e., motivation is low), 
ELM predicts they will rely on the presence of simple-to-associate but potentially 
irrelevant cues to inform their evaluation of information, such as whether the 
information source is attractive (Andrews & Shimp, 1990; Petty et al., 1983; 
Trampe et al., 2010), likeable (Petty et al., 1983; Andrews & Shimp, 1990) or 
knowledgeable (Petty et al., 1981; Jung et al., 2016; Verplanken, 1991). 
For example, Andrews & Shimp (1990) found that making participants 
feel more personally invested in a purchase decision by telling them they would 
receive the advertised product as a gift for participating, that they may be selected 
to participate in a paid interview concerning the advertised product, and that the 
advertised product would soon be available in the local area increased central 
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processing behaviors, such that these participants reported paying more attention 
to, concentrating more on and giving greater thought to the advertisement and 
were able to recall a greater number of messages from the advertisement 
afterwards compared to participants who were made to feel less personally 
invested in the decision. 
Verplanken (1991) found that for low elaboration likelihood participants 
(i.e., those who reported feeling uninvolved in, having little personal relevance to 
and reading/knowing little about the topic of large scale coal use), highly credible 
sources (i.e., “coal experts who are engineers employed at research facilities”) 
were more persuasive and led to greater attitude change than less credible sources 
(i.e., “government brochures and energy company publications”), whereas no 
credibility effects were found for high elaboration likelihood participants 
suggesting that high elaboration likelihood participants’ persuasion depended 
instead on the quality of the argument, how the argument compared with 
participants’ initial attitudes, etc.  
Ability to engage in central processing is related the level of previous 
knowledge one has related to a message topic, the comprehensibility of the 
message, and whether factors like time pressure or distractions are present (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). The more cognitively able one is to engage in deep and 
effortful processing of information, the more likely they should be to do so (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). For example, Walters and Long (2012) found that 
participants who had recently completed an upper-level human nutrition course 
(i.e., were “topic experts”) evaluated a product’s quality and their subsequent 
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intentions to purchase that product based on the match or mismatch between the 
product’s label claim of being “all natural” with actual product ingredients, while 
participants who had not completed such a course (i.e., “topic novices”) used only 
the label claim (i.e., a peripheral cue) to inform their evaluation and purchase 
intentions.  
Like having less knowledge/expertise related to an information topic can 
increase the likelihood of peripheral-route related persuasion, so too can reduced 
cognitive capacity to evaluate information. For example, Festinger and Macoby 
(1964) found that fraternity members were more persuaded by an anti-fraternity 
communication when they were also distracted by watching an amusing film 
while listening to the speech. Kiesler & Mathog (1968) found that when 
participants were distracted with a digit-copying task while listening to a 
speaker’s argument, highly credible speakers (i.e., “Rhodes Scholar”) were more 
persuasive than less credible speakers (i.e., “high school drop-out), whereas non-
distracted participants’ persuasion was not affected by the credibility of the 
speaker. Sparks and Areni (2008) also found that when participants had only 20 
seconds (as opposed to 5 minutes) to read a 600-word speaker transcript, the 
presence of “powerless language” cues (e.g., verbal hesitations) in the transcript 
negatively affected their attitudes toward the speaker’s advocated position.  
Using the predictions of ELM to explain fraud victimization 
Although the predictions of ELM have never been empirically tested in a 
fraud-related decision context, several researchers have proposed ELM as a 
theoretical explanation and framework to better understand consumers’ 
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vulnerability to fraud and scams (e.g., Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Rusch, 1999; 
Lea et al., 2009; Whitty, 2013).  
As Rusch (1999) describes in his theoretical analysis of the social 
engineering of internet fraud, any successful scam necessarily involves “a 
misrepresentation of an offering’s qualities or features”, and as such, “can never 
afford to use a direct route to persuasion” (p.2). In other words, if people used the 
central route to process a scam communication, they would likely recognize red 
flags and avoid victimization. Unfortunately, people have neither the cognitive 
resources to think exhaustively about every communication to which they are 
exposed, nor do they have the motivation to ignore them all (Cacioppo et al., 
1983). By exploiting these limitations, scammers can successfully invoke 
peripheral processing in victims, making it possible to gain victim’s 
persuasion/compliance without their thinking deeply about the matter. 
As Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) describe, most scams follow a 
relatively consistent pattern: victims are enticed with a prize/reward, are deceived 
through use of an elaborate story, and are provided a semi-plausible explanation 
for the request (i.e., to send money, credit card info, etc.), all the while victims’ 
greed serves to overcome any of their outstanding apprehensions. To illustrate this 
pattern, consider an example scam cited by Rusch (1999) in which thousands of 
Yahoo email users were convinced to supply their personal and credit card 
information to a scammer. Victims first received an email message from a 
“Yahoo employee” (i.e., a credible source) notifying them that they had won a 
free computer modem (i.e., an excitement-worthy reward). Victims were then told 
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that to receive their prize, they just needed to provide their credit card information 
“to pay for shipping” (i.e., semi-plausible explanation; Rusch, 1999). 
Following the predictions of ELM, if the Yahoo email users centrally 
processed the scammer’s message, they would likely have recognized that a) they 
never entered a contest to win a computer modem, and b) there was no logical 
reason for Yahoo to give a computer modem away to a random email user for 
free. However, as Rusch (1999) and various other researchers (e.g., Langenderfer 
& Shimp, 2001; Lea et al., 2009; Cukier et al., 2007; Kienpointner, 2006) 
propose, the immediate excitement invoked in victims at the thought of having 
won a substantial prize can command victims’ attention. With less cognitive 
resources to devote to processing decision-relevant information (i.e., scam 
warning signs), victims may relied on irrelevant cues (i.e., scammer’s credibility 
as “Yahoo employee”, likable personality, attractive appearance/style of dress, 
confident speech, etc.) and ultimately determined the scam was worth responding 
to.  
As Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) describe, even when motivation to 
engage in central processing is high, victims may ultimately fail to scrutinize the 
details of a scam offer out of eagerness to reach the reward. This eagerness can 
result in victims paying attention to details of the transaction and ignoring 
warning signs of a scam that may be obvious to others. Indeed, after conducting 
interviews with 25 scam victims across the UK, Lea et al. (2009) found that the 
most frequently mentioned word throughout the transcripts was “money” and that 
two categories present in every interview were the “size of the prize or reward” 
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(i.e., words such as ‘money’, ‘pay’ or ‘prize’) and “trust and security” (i.e., words 
suggesting the scammer was a trustworthy business partner). Empirical research 
has also shown that a positive emotional response to high value incentives is a 
predictive factor of repeated scam victimization (Fischer et al., 2013). 
Some research suggests that the “reward” associated with a scam need not 
be monetary to induce peripheral-route related persuasion and gain victims’ 
compliance either. In her investigation of online dating romance scams, Whitty 
(2013) found that all scam victims reported feeling highly motivated to find a 
romantic relationship and to fall in love at the time of victimization. Just as a large 
monetary reward may lead traditional scam victims to be more motivated to 
appease their greed than to think deeply about the legitimacy of an offer, Whitty 
(2013) proposes that online dating scam victims can become so distracted by a 
scammer’s acts of flattery and the prospect of love that they fail to recognize 
“warning signs” of a scam that are completely obvious to others. Consistent with 
Lea et al. (2009), Whitty (2013) also identified ‘the use of trustworthy personas’ 
as a consistent theme across accounts of victimization. Many of the scammer 
personas described by dating scam victims were “trustworthy” personas – for 
example, an army general, medical doctor, successful businessman, member of 
law enforcement, etc. (Whitty, 2013). As would be predicted by ELM, once 
victims’ attention was being dominated by the reward (i.e., prospect of romance), 
these cues of trustworthiness and credibility likely contributed to victims’ 
persuasion and willingness to comply with the scammer’s requests. 
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Returning to the testimonies of former ITT Tech students submitted as 
part of the recent class action lawsuit, it is evident that many components of these 
narratives closely align with other accounts of fraud and scam victimization (e.g., 
Rusch, 1999; Whitty, 2013). In the next section, the predictions of ELM will be 
applied to the ITT Tech case in attempt to illustrate (from a theoretical 
perspective) how thousands of prospective students may have been persuaded into 
entering predatory and highly disadvantageous student loans.  
A theoretical application of ELM to predatory lending: ITT Tech case study 
Following the predictions of ELM (Appendix A), when someone 
encounters a persuasive communication, what results (i.e., attitude change, 
compliance, etc.) will depend first on whether the person is motivated to deeply 
process the information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Recall that motivation is 
related to how interesting, important or personally relevant a message topic is 
perceived to be. At least theoretically, prospective borrowers should be highly 
motivated to contemplate loan information as they should perceive the loan as 
being highly relevant and important to them. However, as has been proposed by 
various researchers (e.g., Rusch, 1999; Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Lea et al., 
2009), if a desirable reward was presented to prospective borrowers, these 
borrowers’ attention may have shifted away from the nuances of the transaction 
and toward the reward. 
Former ITT Tech students describe university personnel consistently 
emphasizing the “payoffs” associated with attending and graduating from their 
university, such as an impressive education, job, salary, and overall lifestyle: 
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“ITT Technical Institute’s registration process consisted of a 20-30-
minute slideshow about how they would provide the “best” education 
because of instructors who work in the field. This slideshow stated that 
you could make upwards of $100,000 in a job that they could put you in 
after you graduate.” 
“ITT Tech would show charts and graphs about all the companies that 
would hire students post-graduation as well as the specific jobs you could 
expect to obtain with your new degree. They promised a 90+% success 
rate of securing a job after completion of their programs. They also 
promised high salaries where I could easily pay back the student loans 
borrowed on my behalf.” 
“Instead of allowing me to read through the [loan]contract, I was 
pressured to sign on the spot while the recruiter kept asking me, “Do you 
want to work at Publix for the rest of your life?”.  
The notion that affect influences persuasion is well established. As McGuire 
(1985, p. 285) summarizes,  
“Persuasive impact is greater if the person is in a happy, benevolent mood 
when the message comes, noshing on peanuts and soda (Janus et al., 
1965), watching a good program (Krugman, 1983), and with pleasant 
musical background (Galizo and Hendrick, 1972), an appropriately 
scented other (Baron, 1982), a smile on one’s face (Laird, 1974), nodding 
one’s head (Wells & Petty, 1980), or relaxed in posture (Petty et al., 
1983).  
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the positive emotional state induced after 
being assured of a “$100,000 salary” could increase one’s willingness to comply 
with a university representative’s request to sign a disadvantageous student loan. 
As Langenderfer & Shimp (2001) theorize, the effect of motivation on scamming 
vulnerability is mediated by the degree of visceral influence (i.e., greed) at play; if 
this influence is minimal, highly motivated individuals should engage in central 
processing, recognize deception and avoid victimization. If this visceral influence 
is high, however, victims are expected to devote disproportionate attention to the 
reward, failing to recognize scam warning signs.  
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Following the predictions of ELM, even when motivation is high, whether 
central processing will actually follow depends on whether the person is also able 
to think deeply and thoroughly about information. As former ITT Tech students 
describe, university personnel deliberately rushed them through the borrowing 
process and prevented them from reading loan documents in full:  
“He always made you feel like you were holding up a line and ‘hurry up, 
hurry up, get through this web form and that web form, sign, sign, sign’ … 
All they kept telling me was that it’d be fine. I’d make a ton of money when 
I got out of school and started my career.” 
“How fast I was rushed through the documents was unbelievable. They 
would scroll so fast (on the computer) through the documents and just tell 
me to sign here and here. The amount of pressure to quickly sign was a lot 
for me. I was never sent home with anything to review, it was just come in 
for the meeting, sign the stuff and leave.” 
Thus, even if prospective borrowers had the motivation to engage in central 
processing when reviewing the terms of the loan, due to distractions and/or time 
pressure, they would not have had the cognitive capability to do so.  
Following the predictions of ELM, not having the ability to engage in 
central processing should result in a person’s reliance on the presence of 
irrelevant cues from which they can draw conclusions about information quality. 
As former ITT Tech students describe, university financial aid representatives 
repeatedly emphasized the school’s positive reputation with employers, 
impressive job placement rates, caring staff and successes seen by previous 
graduates. For example,  
“I was told during orientation that ITT had a 100% placement rate and 
that each of their students had jobs before they graduated (this was one 
reason I decided to begin classes at ITT). I was promised that I would 
have help and support to help me land a job in my field and that there 
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would not be any trouble because ITT was a very good school and that 
many companies loved ITT graduates and were excited to hire them.” 
Prospective borrowers perceiving the financial aid representative as someone who 
is caring or perceiving the college to be a credible and trustworthy institution may 
therefore have positively influenced their willingness to comply with the 
university representative’s request to sign the loan. This prediction is also 
consistent with previous research conducted by Stark and Choplin (2009) who 
found that ‘trust in the researcher’ and ‘trust in the institution in which the 
research is being conducted’ were the top two reasons participants reported for 
failing to read a participation consent form carefully, if at all.   
While theoretical applications of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
Persuasion to cases of consumer fraud are informative, the predictions of ELM 
have yet to be experimentally tested and confirmed in a fraud-related decision 
scenario. The four experiments described next attempted to fill this gap, and 
explored whether the predictions of ELM could be used to a) explain why 
prospective borrowers agree to sign severely disadvantageous student loans 
(experiments 1 and 2) and b) inform pre-loan counseling that results in more 
effective decision-making (experiments 3 and 4). 
Experiment 1 
In experiment 1, participants were told to imagine they were a first-
generation college student who needed to take out student loans. Half of the 
participants read an additional paragraph containing cues related to the credibility 
of the university and the quality of the education they would receive (credibility 
cue condition). Participants were then either given unlimited time (no time 
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pressure condition) or 30 seconds (time pressure condition) to review a student 
loan disclosure form. The student loan was manipulated to be disadvantageous. 
Participants were then asked to rate the quality of the loan, their willingness to 
take out the loan, and to recall the values associated with various loan terms 
contained in the loan. Following the predictions of ELM, the following 
hypotheses were developed: 
H1: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition will correctly recall 
fewer loan terms post-review than participants assigned to the no time pressure 
condition. 
This hypothesis was based on the premise that reduced ability to elaborate 
on content will result in reduced “mastery” of that content (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986) and is consistent with Sparks and Areni (2008) who found that participants 
given only 20 seconds to read a 600-word speaker transcript subsequently 
correctly answered significantly fewer questions related to arguments contained in 
the transcript than participants given 5 minutes to read the testimonial. 
Two separate methods of scoring were used to analyze “correct” 
responses. Under strict scoring, participants’ responses were considered correct 
only if the first two digits of the values reported matched those of the actual value 
contained in the disclosure form (e.g., any response starting with 47 for the total 
loan amount – true value $47, 240). Under lenient scoring, participants’ responses 
were considered correct if they fell within +/- 10% of the actual value contained 
in the disclosure form (e.g., any response between $42, 516 and $51, 964 for the 
total loan amount – true value $47, 240). While memory for gist (i.e., reflected by 
lenient scoring) is more likely to be used in decision-making than verbatim 
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memory (Reyna, 2013), there is no way to authenticate the recall of gist 
information (LeBoeuf et al., 2016). Considering the variables of interest in 
experiment 1 were both central processing behaviors (aligned with verbatim 
recall) and decision-making effectiveness (potentially aligned with verbatim or 
gist recall), responses were analyzed using both scoring methods separately.   
H2: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the credibility cue 
condition will evaluate the quality of the (disadvantageous) loan as higher than 
participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the no credibility cue 
condition.  
H3: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the credibility cue 
condition will report greater willingness to take out the (disadvantageous) loan 
than participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the no credibility 
cue condition. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are consistent with previous research (e.g., Festinger 
& Macoby, 1964; Kiesler & Mathog, 1968; Sparks & Areni, 2008) and are based 
on the premise that reducing participants’ cognitive ability to process loan 
information will result in their increased reliance on irrelevant cues (in this case, 
ones suggesting credibility and trustworthiness) to inform their evaluation of the 
loan’s quality and their intentions to take out the loan. 
Method 
Participants  
Participants in experiment 1 were 91 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
‘Master’ workers between 18 and 26 years of age (Mage = 24.6 years; 27 women; 
MEducation = 15.4 years where 16 years = completed bachelor’s degree; MAnnualIncome 
= $57,854; 74.7% have had student loans in real life). MTurk workers who have 
achieved a ‘Master’ qualification have consistently demonstrated a high degree of 
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success in performing a wide range of HITs across a large number of requesters 
(MTurk FAQs, 2017).  
Study Design 
Experiment 1 used a 2 (Time pressure: time pressure, no time pressure) x 
2 (Credibility cues: credibility cues, no credibility cues) multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) where the dependent variables were loan quality ratings (on 
a scale of 1-5), ratings of willingness to take out the loan (on a scale of 1-5), and 
the number of loan terms correctly recalled post-loan review (survey q’s 3 – 13; 
min 0 – max 11) as determined by both strict scoring and lenient scoring. 
Stimuli 
This study used the private education loan disclosure form contained in 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Regulations Appendix H-23: Private 
Education Loan Final Sample. This one-page form discloses a borrower’s fees 
and summarizes the loan’s terms (Appendix B).  
The loan terms contained in the disclosure form were intended to reflect 
realistic, but objectively disadvantageous terms for a private student loan. The 
chosen total loan amount ($47,240) and initial interest rate (8.00%) are consistent 
with the amount needed to cover the average total tuition costs for a 4-year for-
profit college (Student Loan Hero, 2018) and with the range of variable private 
loan interest rates available in the market today, respectively. All other loan terms 
were calculated using a Student Loan Payment Calculator for accuracy (Student 
Loan Hero Payment Calculator, 2018). 
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Procedure 
Participants were recruited on MTurk and provided with a link to the study 
hosted on Qualtrics. All participants first read an introductory paragraph: 
“Imagine you are a prospective college student who needs to take out 
student loans. You feel proud at the thought of being the first person in 
your family to attain a college degree. You are concerned about taking on 
debt, but believe it will be worth it to make a better life for yourself and 
your family. During your visit to a local college, you meet with the campus 
financial aid representative.”  
Those participants assigned to the credibility cue condition then read, 
“The financial aid representative is very friendly. She tells you that she 
and the rest of the campus staff are dedicated to making sure that students 
who attend their university are successful. She says the university has a 
100% placement rate and that all of their students have jobs secured 
before graduating. She tells you that previous graduates of your chosen 
program are making an average yearly salary of over $80,000.” 
These credibility cues are consistent with both the type of information former ITT 
Tech students recall receiving during sales pitches, as well as with research 
showing that perceptions of trust and credibility are dependent on indicators of 
competence (i.e., knowledge and expertise), character (i.e., openness and 
honesty), and caring (i.e., concern and care; Peters et al., 1997; Myers & Bryant, 
2004).  
All participants then went on to read, 
“You are able to secure partial funding from federal loans for which your 
monthly payment upon graduation will be $357, but you will need private 
loans to cover the remainder of your tuition costs.  
The financial aid representative tells you she can offer you a private loan 
with great terms.” 
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Participants then read a set of instructions related to the amount of time they 
would have to review the loan. Participants assigned to the no time pressure 
condition were told, 
“You will now view the terms of this loan. Please take your time and read 
these terms carefully. After you have finished reviewing the terms, hit 
‘enter’ to move on to the next page where you will be asked to answer 
several questions about these terms and to evaluate the quality of the loan. 
Note: You will not be allowed to return back to review the loan again once 
you have moved on to the questions.” 
Participants assigned to the no time pressure condition had unlimited time to 
review the student loan disclosure form (MNoPressure = 110.13 seconds).  
Participants assigned to the time pressure condition were told, 
 
“You will now view the terms of this loan. You will only be permitted to 
view these terms for a limited time, so please read through them as quickly 
as possible. After you have finished reviewing the terms, hit ‘enter’ to 
move on to the next page where you will be asked to answer several 
questions about these terms and to evaluate the quality of the loan. If the 
loan terms page times out before you hit ‘enter’, you will automatically be 
moved forward to these questions. Note: You will not be allowed to return 
back to review the loan again once you have moved on to the questions.”  
 
Participants assigned to the time pressure condition had 30 seconds to review the 
disclosure form after which the page timed out and automatically moved them 
forward to the next page (if they had not already moved forward on their own; 
MTimePressure = 26.80 seconds). The decision to warn participants of an impending 
time limitation is consistent with previous research (e.g., Sparks & Areni, 2008).  
After participants finished reviewing the student loan disclosure form they 
were asked to answer a series of questions. Participants were informed that these 
questions would be presented one at a time and that they would not be permitted 
to change any answer after it had been submitted. 
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1. On a scale of 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good), please rate the quality of this 
student loan. 
2. On a scale of 1 (very unwilling) to 5 (very willing) please rate how willing 
you would be to take out this student loan if you were the student in the 
scenario. 
3. What was the total loan amount for this loan? 
4. What was the interest rate for this loan?  
5. What was the finance charge for this loan? 
6. What was the total of payments for this loan? 
7. What was the late charge fee for this loan? 
8. What was the monthly payment for this loan?  
9. What was the origination fee for this loan? 
10. What was the repayment term for this loan (in years)? 
11. What was the maximum interest rate for this loan?  
12. What was the maximum monthly payment for this loan?  
13. Did this loan have a fixed or variable interest rate?  
Participants were then asked to complete a short demographic survey: 
1. What is your gender?  
2. What is your age?  
3. What is your ethnicity?  
4. How many years of formal education do you have? (12 = completed high 
school/GED, 14 = associates, 16 = BA/BS/AB; 18 = MA; 20 = PhD, JD, 
MD, DDS) 
5. What is your (or your family’s) approximate annual income?  
6. Have you ever had student loans? (Y/N) 
Results 
H1: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition will correctly recall 
fewer loan terms (q3 – 13) post-review than participants assigned to the no 
time pressure condition. 
 The multivariate result was not significant for time pressure, F (4, 84) = 
.881, p = .479; Wilk’s Λ = .960, partial η2 = .040. In contrast to predictions, there 
was no significant difference between the number of loan terms correctly recalled 
by participants assigned to the time pressure condition (m = 5.701) or participants 
assigned to the no time pressure condition (m = 6.859) under strict scoring or 
between participants assigned to the time pressure (m = 6.723) or no time pressure 
condition (m = 7.782) under lenient scoring. 
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H2: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the credibility 
cue condition will evaluate the quality of the (disadvantageous) loan as 
higher than participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the no 
credibility cue condition.  
 There was not a statistically significant interaction effect between time 
pressure and credibility cues, F (4, 84) = 1.497, p = .211; Wilk’s Λ = .933, partial 
η2 = .067. In contrast to predictions, there was no significant difference between 
ratings of loan quality reported by participants assigned to the time pressure and 
the credibility cue condition (m = 2.926) or participants assigned to the time 
pressure and the no credibility cue condition (m = 2.227). 
H3: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the credibility 
cue condition will report greater willingness to take out the 
(disadvantageous) loan than participants assigned to the time pressure 
condition and the no credibility cue condition. 
 There was not a statistically significant interaction effect between time 
pressure and credibility cues, F (4, 84) = 1.497, p = .211; Wilk’s Λ = .933, partial 
η2 = .067. In contrast to predictions, there was no significant difference between 
ratings of willingness to take out the loan reported by participants assigned to the 
time pressure and the credibility cue condition (m = 2.704) or participants 
assigned to the time pressure and the no credibility cue condition (m = 2.091).  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 used a procedure identical to that of experiment 1 except 
that participants in experiment 2 completed the study in a laboratory while hooked 
up to an eye-tracker. In addition to hypotheses 1-3 from experiment 1, it was also 
predicted in experiment 2 that: 
26 
 
 
 
H4: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition will visually fixate on 
fewer loan terms contained in the disclosure form than participants assigned to 
the no time pressure condition. 
H5: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition will visually fixate on 
loan terms contained in the disclosure form for a shorter duration than 
participants assigned to the no time pressure condition.  
Hypotheses 4 and 5 were developed to provide additional support for the 
hypothesis that reducing participants’ ability would reduce their central 
processing behaviors (i.e., experiment 1, hypothesis 1). While much previous 
research has operationalized central processing behaviors in terms of accurate 
recall of information, significantly less has used visual attention as a measure. 
One exception is Yang (2015), who found no significant differences in fixation 
duration between the high and low elaboration groups. However, participants in 
this research were not subjected to a cognitive ability manipulation; ability was 
measured as participants’ self-perceived levels of product knowledge and 
experience (i.e., low product knowledge/experience = low ability; Yang, 2015). 
H6: Participants assigned to the time pressure and the credibility cue condition 
will visually fixate on fewer critical loan terms contained in the disclosure form 
than participants assigned to the time pressure and the no credibility cue 
condition.  
H7: Participants assigned to the time pressure and the credibility cue condition 
will visually fixate on critical loan terms contained in the disclosure form for a 
shorter duration than participants assigned to the time pressure and the no 
credibility cue condition. 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 are consistent with research showing that task and 
goal-relevant information tends to receive the most attention in a visual display 
(e.g., Pieters & Wedel, 2007). As such, visual fixations and gaze durations should 
provide insight into the information that participants deemed most important 
when evaluating the loan (LeBeouf et al., 2016). Following the predictions of 
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ELM, participants assigned to the time pressure and credibility cue condition 
should be less likely to identify and pay attention to the critical loan terms 
contained in the disclosure form compared to participants assigned to the time 
pressure and no credibility cue condition, who without irrelevant cues to rely on, 
should be more inclined to identify decision-relevant information. 
To address hypotheses 4 – 7, areas of interest (AOIs) were created around 
24 terms/information blurbs contained in the disclosure form (Appendix C). Ten 
AOIs were drawn around “critical” loan terms (e.g., total loan amount, 
initial/adjustable interest rate, total of payments, repayment term, etc.) and 14 
AOIs were drawn around other “non-critical” terms (e.g., fees, etc.). Whether 
participants fixated on or within an AOI (coded as a “1” or “0)”, where fixations 
referred to instances in which the eye remained still for at least 200 milliseconds 
(Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000; LeBeouf et al., 2016), and the duration (in seconds) 
for which these fixations lasted were tracked and analyzed. 
Method  
Participants  
Participants in experiment 2 were 80 undergraduate students from DePaul 
University’s Introductory Psychology subject pool who were at least 18 years of 
age (Mage = 19.7 years; 55 women; MEducation = 12.4 years where 16 years = 
completed bachelor’s degree; MAnnualIncome = $104, 450; 62% have had student 
loans in real life). Participants received course credit for participation.  
Study Design 
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Experiment 2 used a 2 (Time pressure: time pressure, no time pressure) x 
2 (Source credibility cues: credibility cues, no credibility cues) MANOVA where 
the dependent variables were loan quality ratings (on a scale of 1-5), ratings of 
willingness to take out the loan (on a scale of 1-5), the number of loan terms 
correctly recalled post-loan review (survey q’s 3 – 13; min 0 – max 11), the 
number of loan term AOIs visually fixated on (min 0 – max 24), the number of 
critical loan term AOIs visually fixated on (min 0 – max 10), the total duration of 
fixations on loan term AOIs, and the total duration of fixations on critical loan 
term AOIs.  
Apparatus 
Participants’ eye movements were recorded monocularly at a sampling 
rate of 1000Hz using the SR Research EyeLink 1000 infrared eye-tracking 
system.  
Procedure  
Participants in experiment 2 were greeted by a researcher and brought into 
an eye-tracking laboratory. After participants were successfully calibrated on the 
eye-tracker, they were shown the same survey and followed the same instructions 
as participants in experiment 1.  
Results 
H1: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition will correctly recall 
fewer loan term values (survey q’s 3 – 13) post-review than participants 
assigned to the no time pressure condition. 
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 The multivariate result was significant for time pressure, F (8, 68) = 
4.338, p < .001; Wilk’s Λ = .212, partial η2 = .788. Univariate tests showed there 
was a significant difference across time pressure conditions for loan term recall. 
Consistent with predictions, participants assigned to the time pressure condition 
recalled significantly fewer loan terms post-review than participants assigned to 
the no time pressure condition, regardless of scoring method used (i.e., strict or 
lenient).  
Under strict scoring (i.e., verbatim recall), participants assigned to the time 
pressure condition correctly recalled significantly fewer loan terms overall (m = 
2.600) than participants assigned to the no time pressure condition (m = 4.378), F 
(1, 75) = 23.122, p < .001; partial η2 = .236. Participants assigned to the time 
pressure condition also recalled significantly fewer critical loan terms specifically 
(m = 2.100) than participants assigned to the no time pressure condition (m = 
3.250), F (1, 75) = 16.182, p < .001; partial η2 = .177.  
Under lenient scoring, participants assigned to the time pressure condition 
still recalled significantly fewer loan terms overall (m = 4.575) than participants 
assigned to the no time pressure condition (m = 6.471), F (1, 75) = 21.507; p < 
.001; partial η2 = .223. Participants assigned to the time pressure condition also 
recalled significantly fewer critical loan terms specifically (m = 3.350) than 
participants assigned to the no time pressure condition (m = 4.449) under lenient 
scoring, F (1, 75) = 12.003; p < .01; partial η2 = .138. 
H2: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the credibility 
cue condition will evaluate the quality of the (disadvantageous) loan as 
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higher than participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the no 
credibility cue condition.  
There was not a statistically significant interaction effect between time 
pressure and credibility cues, F (8, 68) = 1.182, p = .323; Wilk’s Λ = .878, partial 
η2 = .122. In contrast to predictions, there was no significant difference between 
the ratings of loan quality reported by participants assigned to the time pressure 
and the credibility cue condition (m = 2.800) or participants assigned to the time 
pressure and the no credibility cue condition (m = 2.900). 
H3: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition and the credibility 
cue condition will report greater willingness to take out the 
(disadvantageous) loan than participants assigned to the time pressure 
condition and the no credibility cue condition. 
There was not a statistically significant interaction effect between time 
pressure and credibility cues, F (8, 68) = 1.182, p = .323; Wilk’s Λ = .878, partial 
η2 = .122. In contrast to predictions, there was no significant difference between 
the ratings of willingness to take out the loan reported by participants assigned to 
the time pressure and the credibility cue condition (m = 2.600) or participants 
assigned to the time pressure and the no credibility cue condition (m = 2.550). 
H4: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition will visually fixate 
on fewer loan term AOIs contained in the disclosure form than participants 
assigned to the no time pressure condition. 
The multivariate result was significant for time pressure, F (8, 68) = 
4.338, p < .001; Wilk’s Λ = .212, partial η2 = .788. Univariate tests showed there 
was a significant difference across time pressure conditions for the number of 
loan term AOIs visually fixated on in the disclosure form. Consistent with 
predictions, participants assigned to the time pressure condition visually fixated 
on significantly fewer loan term AOIs (m = 11.350) than participants assigned to 
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the no time pressure condition (m = 20.780), F (1, 75) = 208.720, p < .001; partial 
η2 = .736. Participants assigned to the time pressure condition also visually 
fixated on significantly fewer critical loan term AOIs, specifically, (m = 5.050) 
than participants assigned to the no time pressure condition (m = 8.759), F (1, 75) 
= 110.720, p < .001, partial η2 = .596. 
H5: Participants assigned to the time pressure condition will visually fixate 
on loan term AOIs for a shorter duration than participants assigned to the 
no time pressure condition.  
The multivariate result was significant for time pressure, F (8, 68) = 
4.338, p < .001; Wilk’s Λ = .212, partial η2 = .788. Univariate tests showed there 
was a significant difference across time pressure conditions for the duration of 
AOI fixations. Consistent with predictions, participants assigned to the time 
pressure condition fixated on loan term AOIs for a shorter total duration (m = 
14.441 seconds) than participants assigned to the no time pressure condition (m = 
69.359 seconds), F (1, 75) = 85.313, p < .001; partial η2 = .532. Participants 
assigned to the time pressure condition also fixated on critical loan term AOIs, 
specifically, for a significantly shorter total duration (m = 5.817 seconds) than 
participants assigned to the no time pressure condition (m = 22.254 seconds), F 
(1, 75) = 70.865, p < .001, partial η2 = .486. 
Regression analysis was also used to investigate whether participants’ 
duration of fixations on critical loan terms mediated the relationship between the 
time participants had to review the disclosure form and their ratings of loan 
quality. In step one of the mediation model, the regression of time permitted to 
review the disclosure form on quality ratings, ignoring the mediator (fixation 
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duration on critical loan terms) was not significant, b = -.363, SE = .225, p = .111. 
Some researchers (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986) suggest that mediation analysis 
should only be conducted if there is a significant direct relationship (e.g., here, 
time pressure and quality ratings), but this is controversial, and other researchers 
(e.g., Shrout & Bolger, 2002) suggest it is acceptable to conduct a mediation 
analysis even if there is not a significant direct relationship. In step two of the 
mediation model, regression of time permitted to review the disclosure form on 
the duration of critical loan terms was significant, b = 16.441, SE = 1.979, p < 
.001, but a regression of critical loan term fixation duration on quality ratings was 
not statistically significant, b = -.016, SE = .009, p = .095. Many researchers 
conclude that mediation is not possible or likely if one or more of the zero-order 
relationships are nonsignificant. However, others suggest this is not always true 
(e.g., see MacKinnon et al., 2007). Thus, the indirect relationship between time 
permitted to review the disclosure form and quality ratings as mediated by the 
duration of fixations on critical loan terms was analyzed. Controlling for the 
mediator (duration of fixation on critical loan terms), time permitted to review the 
disclosure form was (still) not a significant predictor of quality ratings, b = -.194, 
SE = .309 p = .526. A Sobel test was conducted and found no significant 
mediation in the model, z = 1.58, SE = 3.7, p = .113. 
H6: Participants assigned to the time pressure and the credibility cue 
condition will visually fixate on fewer critical loan term AOIs than 
participants assigned to the time pressure and the no credibility cue 
condition.  
There was not a statistically significant interaction effect between time 
pressure and credibility cues, F (8, 68) = 1.191, p = .323; Wilk’s Λ = .878, partial 
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η2 = .122. In contrast to predictions, there was no significant difference between 
the number of critical loan term AOIs visually fixated on by participants assigned 
to the time pressure and the credibility cue condition (m = 4.857) or participants 
assigned to the time pressure and the no credibility cue condition (m = 5.200). 
H7: Participants assigned to the time pressure and the credibility cue 
condition will visually fixate on critical loan term AOIs for a shorter 
duration than participants assigned to the time pressure and the no 
credibility cue condition. 
There was not a statistically significant interaction effect between time 
pressure and credibility cues, F (8, 68) = 1.191, p = .323; Wilk’s Λ = .878, partial 
η2 = .122. In contrast to predictions, there was no significant difference between 
the duration of fixations on critical loan term AOIs by participants assigned to the 
time pressure and the credibility cue condition (m = 5.849 seconds) or participants 
assigned to the time pressure and the no credibility cue condition (m = 5.953 
seconds). 
Discussion – Experiments 1 and 2 
 Experiment 1 yielded no significant results. In experiment 2, only the 
predicted main effects were found to be statistically significant. Consistent with 
predictions, participants assigned to the time pressure condition in experiment 2 
correctly recalled significantly fewer loan terms post-review (including critical 
loan terms, specifically), visually fixated on significantly fewer loan terms 
contained in the disclosure form (including critical loan terms, specifically), and 
visually fixated on loan terms (including critical loan terms, specifically) for a 
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significantly shorter duration than participants assigned to the no time pressure 
condition.  
These findings suggest that when a consumer has limited time to review a 
disclosure form, they will be less likely to look at all of the loan terms contained 
in the form (including critical terms) and be less likely to correctly recall the 
values (verbatim or gist) associated with loan terms afterwards. There was not a 
significant relationship found between time pressure and quality ratings, nor was 
duration of fixations on critical loan terms found to be a significant mediator of 
this relationship in experiment 2. However, failing to look at and/or correctly 
recall the values associated with the terms of one’s loan in the real world could 
lead consumers to making disadvantageous decisions, such that they could end up 
signing a loan without even being aware that it contained certain disadvantageous 
terms such as a variable and/or uncapped interest rate, or being mistaken about the 
values of certain terms.  
A possible explanation for the discrepancy in significant findings between 
experiment 1 and experiment 2 is that experiment 1 participants were MTurk 
workers and devoted less time to the task than experiment 2 participants (i.e., 
DePaul undergraduates) who were under the supervision of a researcher. 
Although participants assigned to the no time pressure condition in experiment 1 
spent significantly more time reviewing the disclosure form (m = 109.245 
seconds) than participants assigned to the time pressure condition (m = 26.856 
seconds), F (1, 89) = 21.809, p < .001, participants assigned to the no time 
pressure condition in experiment 1 (i.e., MTurk workers) spent significantly less 
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time reviewing the disclosure form (m = 109.245 seconds) than participants 
assigned to the no time pressure condition in experiment 2 (DePaul 
undergraduates; m = 342.210 seconds), F (1, 79) = 65.536, p < .001. To mitigate 
the potential issues associated with reduced effort and attention, future research 
should be conducted with participants in a laboratory (as opposed to online) 
whenever possible. 
The expected interaction effect between time pressure and credibility cues 
was not significant in experiment 1 or experiment 2. In contrast to predictions, 
there were no significant differences in ratings of loan quality, ratings of 
willingness to take out the loan, the number of critical AOIs visually fixated on, 
or the duration of critical AOI fixations by participants assigned to the time 
pressure and the credibility cue condition or participants assigned to the time 
pressure and the no credibility cue condition. It is unknown why participants 
assigned to the time pressure and credibility cue condition did not exhibit 
peripheral processing behaviors as would have been predicted by ELM, but 
possible that because participants were not truly desperate prospective borrowers, 
they may have simply been less influenced by the credibility cues. Because the 
loan was clearly disadvantageous, it is possible that participants in experiment 1 
and 2 recognized this was the case and ended their decision-making there, 
whereas true prospective borrowers may have recognized the loan was 
disadvantageous but due to their emotional connection to attending college and 
perceptions of the university being credible and trustworthy, decided to go 
through with signing anyway (consistent with Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001). 
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Future research should aim to investigate decision-making in individuals more 
representative of prospective borrowers and attendees of for-profit colleges.    
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 followed a procedure similar to experiments 1 and 2, except 
that participants in experiment 3 were all assigned to the time pressure and 
credibility cue condition, but then received one of four randomly assigned pre-
loan counseling sessions prior to reviewing the student loan disclosure form. 
Following the predictions of ELM, increasing participants’ knowledge of and 
familiarity with the disclosure form pre-review should make them more likely to 
engage in central processing during review of the form. Experiment 3 investigated 
whether indeed this was the case and whether central processing likelihood would 
differ based on the type of additional information (i.e., visual vs. auditory) 
provided by the counseling.  
Participants assigned to the “definitions only” counseling condition heard 
the definitions of and information related to five critical loan terms contained in 
the disclosure form. Participants assigned to the “locations only” counseling 
condition saw where these five critical loan terms were located in the disclosure 
form. Participants assigned to the “definitions and locations” condition heard the 
definitions and saw the locations of the five critical loan terms simultaneously. 
Participants assigned to the “no counseling” condition neither heard the 
definitions nor saw the locations of the five critical loan terms. Following the 
predictions of ELM, the following hypotheses were developed: 
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H1: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will rate the quality of 
the (disadvantageous) loan as higher than participants assigned to any of the 
counseling conditions (definitions only, locations only or definitions and locations 
condition). 
H1a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will rate the 
quality of the (disadvantageous) loan as higher than participants assigned 
to the locations only or the definitions and locations conditions.  
H2: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will report being more 
willing to take out the loan than participants assigned to any of the counseling 
conditions (definitions only, locations only or definitions and locations condition).  
H2a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will report 
being more willing to take out the (disadvantageous) loan than 
participants assigned to the locations only or the definitions and locations 
conditions.  
H3: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will correctly recall 
fewer critical loan terms than participants assigned to any of the counseling 
conditions (definitions only, locations only or definitions and locations condition).  
H3a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will correctly 
recall fewer critical loan terms than participants assigned to the locations 
only or definitions and locations conditions.  
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are consistent with previous research (e.g., Walters 
& Long, 2012) and are based on the premise that the more knowledge of or 
familiarity one has with information, the more likely they will be to engage in 
central processing of that information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Hypothesis 3 is 
also consistent with previous research showing that participants were more likely 
to correctly recall the values associated with loan attributes that were discussed 
with them just prior to reviewing the loan (LeBeouf et al., 2016).  
 Hypotheses 1a, 2a and 3a were exploratory and were developed based on 
evidence suggesting that prospective borrowers do not necessarily benefit from 
being provided loan term definitions or information related to how various terms 
affect repayment if this information is provided in a very short period of time. The 
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Federal Government requires (and has required since 1992) that all students 
borrowing Federal Direct Loans complete an ‘entrance counseling’ to ensure that 
students understand the responsibilities and obligations they are assuming 
(Federal Reserve, 2016). Today this ‘entrance counseling’ involves a one-time 
online course that covers five sections: “Understand your loans” (basic terms and 
concepts), “Managing your spending” (interactive budgeting tool), “Planning to 
repay” (compare how anticipated salary will affect future monthly payments and 
repayment options), “Avoiding default” (options to avoid loan default), and 
“Making finances a priority” (healthy spending and saving habits to pay off your 
loans faster; Federal Student Aid Entrance Counseling, 2018).  
While this counseling should theoretically increase prospective borrowers’ 
knowledge/familiarity with student loans and thus increase the likelihood that 
these borrowers engage in central processing when reviewing the terms of their 
Federal Loans, research suggests this is not the case. Forty percent of surveyed 
Federal loan borrowers reported having no memory of going through student loan 
counseling (Whitsett & O’Sullivan, 2012), and interviews conducted with 
financial counselors around the country reveal that students are generally unable 
to remember the vast amount of material covered in the counseling and fail to use 
it to their advantage when ultimately reviewing the terms of a proffered loan 
(Federal Reserve, 2016). Financial counselors hypothesize this is because of the 
strict time limits associated with federal loan counseling; prospective borrowers 
are required to complete the 20 to 30-minute counseling in a single session 
without the ability to save partial progress and return later (Federal Reserve, 
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2016). It was predicted in experiment 3 that a less cognitively demanding 
counseling aimed at increasing participants’ awareness of the spatial locations of 
key terms might therefore be more effective at increasing central processing.  
Method 
Participants  
Participants in experiment 3 were 74 non-Chinese speaking Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) ‘Master’ workers between 18 and 26 years of age 
(MAge = 23.6 years; 53 women; MEducation =15.9 years where 16 years = completed 
bachelor’s degree; MAnnualIncome = $51,645; 91% have had student loans in real 
life). Participants were compensated $2.00 for participating.  
Study Design 
Experiment 3 used a 2 (Loan term definitions: Definitions, No 
Definitions) x 2 (Loan term locations: Locations, No Locations) MANOVA 
where dependent variables were loan quality ratings (on a scale of 1-5), reported 
willingness to take out the loan (on a scale of 1-5) and the number of critical loan 
terms correctly recalled post-review (min 0 – max 8). 
Procedure 
Experiment 3 followed a procedure identical to that followed by 
participants assigned to the time pressure and the credibility cue condition in 
experiments 1 and 2. However, just before participants in experiment 3 went on to 
review the disclosure form, they were told they would first watch a brief video. 
All videos were embedded directly into the Qualtrics survey. 
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Participants assigned to the definitions only counseling condition saw a 
blank disclosure form (i.e., a white square outlined in black) on the screen while 
they heard the definitions/information related to five critical loan terms read aloud 
in English by a female speaker. The script for the definitions only condition read 
as follows: 
“I will now go over several key loan terms contained in a student loan 
disclosure form.  
The total loan amount represents the total amount you are borrowing. 
The interest rate is the amount charged, expressed as a percentage of the 
principal loan amount, by a lender to a borrower. 
A fixed interest rate means the interest rate will remain the same over the 
entire life of the loan. A variable interest rate means that the interest rate 
and monthly payments can change. There may be a limit, or ‘cap’, on the 
amount the interest rate can increase. This is called the maximum interest 
rate. If there is no limit or ‘cap’ on the interest rate, the interest rate can 
rise infinitely. 
The loan term is the number of years (or months) the loan will last if only 
the required minimum payments are made each month. 
The monthly payment is the amount a borrower is required to pay each 
month until debt is paid off. The monthly payment is based on the total 
loan amount, loan term, and interest rate. Remember that a variable 
interest rate means that the required monthly payment can change. If there 
is no maximum interest rate, the monthly payment can rise infinitely too.” 
Participants assigned to the locations only counseling condition saw 
where each of the critical loan terms discussed in the definitions only condition 
script (i.e., total loan amount, interest rate, fixed vs. variable rate, loan term, and 
monthly payment) were located in the disclosure form, highlighted with a red box 
one by one (Appendix D). To control for the auditory stimulus present in the 
definitions only condition, participants in the locations only condition heard the 
same script as that presented to participants in the definitions only condition, but 
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this script was read in Chinese by a female speaker (as opposed to English). As all 
participants had self-identified as non-Chinese speakers prior to beginning the 
survey, it was impossible for participants in the locations only condition to 
understand what they were hearing. 
Participants assigned to the definitions and locations counseling 
condition viewed the same video as participants assigned to the locations only 
condition in which the spatial locations of the critical terms were highlighted via a 
red box, but also heard the same script as participants assigned to the definitions 
only condition in which the definitions of these critical terms read by a female 
speaker speaking in English (Appendix E), simultaneously. 
Participants assigned to the no counseling condition saw a blank 
disclosure form (i.e., a white square outlined in black) on the screen while the 
definitions of the loan terms were read by a female speaker in Chinese.  
To ensure that participants watched/listened to the entire counseling video, 
the page containing the videos on Qualtrics was set to allow participants to move 
on to the next page only after the video finished playing. Participants were also 
asked whether the voice of the speaker in the video was the voice of a man or 
woman. Participants who answered this question incorrectly (i.e., responded 
“male”) were rejected from the study and were not permitted to move on to 
complete the rest of the survey.  
 All participants then reviewed the same disclosure form and answered the 
same survey and demographic questions as in experiments 1 and 2. 
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Results 
H1: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will rate the quality 
of the (disadvantageous) loan as higher than participants assigned to any of 
the counseling conditions (definitions only, locations only or definitions and 
locations condition). 
H1a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will rate 
the quality of the (disadvantageous) loan as higher than participants 
assigned to the locations only or definitions and locations conditions.  
The multivariate result was not significant for counseling condition, F (6, 
65) = 1.346, p = .164; Wilk’s Λ = .705, partial η2 = .110. In contrast to 
predictions, there was no significant difference between the ratings of loan quality 
reported by participants assigned to the definitions only (m = 3.667), locations 
only (m = 3.550), definitions and locations (m = 4.053), or no counseling 
condition (m = 3.353).  
H2: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will report being 
more willing to take out the loan than participants assigned to any of the 
counseling conditions (definitions only, locations only or definitions and 
locations condition).  
H2a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will report 
being more willing to take out the loan than participants assigned to 
the locations only or definitions and locations conditions.  
The multivariate result was not significant for counseling condition, F (6, 
65) = 1.346, p = .164; Wilk’s Λ = .705, partial η2 = .110. In contrast to 
predictions, there was no significant difference between the ratings of willingness 
to take out the loan reported by participants assigned to the definitions only (m = 
3.722), locations only (m = 3.650), definitions and locations (m = 3.842), or no 
counseling condition (m = 3.059).  
H3: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will correctly recall 
fewer critical loan terms than participants assigned to any of the counseling 
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conditions (definitions only, locations only or definitions and locations 
condition) 
H3a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will 
correctly recall fewer critical loan terms than participants assigned to 
the locations only or definitions and locations conditions.  
The multivariate result was not significant for counseling condition, F (6, 
65) = 1.346, p = .164; Wilk’s Λ = .705, partial η2 = .110. In contrast to 
predictions, there was no significant difference between the number of critical 
loan terms correctly recalled by participants assigned to the definitions only (m = 
3.611), locations only (m = 3.600), definitions and locations (m = 4.105), or no 
counseling condition (m = 3.353) under strict scoring, or by participants assigned 
to definitions only (m = 4.389), locations only (m = 4.150), definitions and 
locations (m = 4.684), or no counseling condition (m = 3.941) under lenient 
scoring. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 used a procedure identical to that of experiment 3, except 
participants in experiment 4 completed the study in a laboratory while hooked up 
to an eye-tracker. In addition to hypotheses 1-3 from experiment 3, it was also 
predicted in experiment 4 that: 
H4: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will visually fixate on 
fewer critical loan term AOIs than participants assigned to any of the counseling 
conditions (definitions only, locations only, or definitions and locations 
condition).  
H4a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will visually 
fixate on fewer critical loan term AOIs than participants assigned to the 
locations only or definitions and locations conditions.  
H5: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will visually fixate on 
critical loan term AOIs for a shorter total duration than participants assigned to 
any of the counseling conditions (definitions only, locations only, or both). 
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H5a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will visually 
fixate on critical loan term AOIs for a shorter total duration than 
participants assigned to the locations only or definitions and locations 
conditions.  
Following the predictions of ELM, providing participants with additional 
information, whether through auditory definitions, visual locations, or both, 
should increase participants’ likelihood of engaging in central processing and 
identifying these critical terms in the loan form. Hypotheses 4 and 5 are also 
consistent previous research showing that drawing participants’ attention to 
certain loan attributes prior to their reviewing a disclosure form increased their 
subsequent visual attention to those terms (Stark et al., 2013; LeBoeuf et al., 
2016). 
Hypotheses 4a and 5a are consistent with research showing that 
identifying the spatial locations of certain attributes in forms, specifically, prior to 
review increased the visual attention participants paid to those attributes later on 
(Soto & Blaco, 2004; LeBoeuf et al., 2016). Participants assigned to the 
definitions only condition should therefore be less likely to visually fixate on 
critical loan terms than participants assigned to counseling conditions in which 
the spatial locations of those critical loan terms were highlighted in their 
counseling session prior to review (i.e., locations only, definitions and locations 
condition). 
Method  
Participants 
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Participants were 83 undergraduate students from DePaul University’s 
Introductory Psychology subject pool who are at least 18 years of age (MAge = 
19.8 years; 52 women; MEducation = 12.6 years where 16 years = completed 
bachelor’s degree; MAnnualIncome = $96,220; 63% have had student loans in real 
life). Participants received course credit for participation.  
Study Design 
Experiment 4 used a 2 (Loan term definitions: Definitions, No 
Definitions) x 2 (Loan term locations: Locations, No Locations) MANOVA 
where dependent variables were loan quality evaluation ratings (on a scale of 1-
5), reported willingness to take out the loan (on a scale of 1-5), the number of 
critical loan terms correctly recalled post-review (min 0 – max 8), the number of 
critical loan term AOIs visually fixated (min 0 – max 10), and the total duration of 
fixations on critical loan term AOIs. 
Procedure 
Participants in experiment 4 were greeted by a researcher and brought into 
an eye-tracking laboratory. After participants were successfully calibrated on the 
eye-tracker, they were shown the same survey and followed the same instructions 
as in experiment 3.  
Results 
H1: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will rate the quality 
of the (disadvantageous) loan as higher than participants assigned to any of 
the counseling conditions (definitions only, locations only or definitions and 
locations condition). 
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H1a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will rate 
the quality of the (disadvantageous) loan as higher than participants 
assigned to the locations only or definitions and locations conditions.  
There were no significant differences in loan quality ratings reported by 
participants assigned to the definitions only (m = 2.36), locations only (m = 2.59), 
definitions and locations (m = 2.68), or no counseling condition (m = 2.40), F (3, 
78) = .590, p = .623; partial η2 = .022. 
H2: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will report being 
more willing to take out the loan than participants assigned to any of the 
counseling conditions (definitions only, locations only or definitions and 
locations condition).  
H2a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will report 
being more willing to take out the loan than participants assigned to 
the locations only or definitions and locations conditions.  
There were no significant differences in reported willingness to take out 
the loan by participants assigned to the definitions only (m = 2.09), locations only 
(m = 2.41), definitions and locations (m = 2.63), or no counseling condition (m = 
2.45), F (3, 78) = .906, p = .442; partial η2 = .034. 
 H3: Participants assigned to the no counseling conditions will correctly 
recall fewer critical loan terms than participants assigned to any of the 
counseling conditions.  
H3a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will 
correctly recall fewer critical loan terms than participants assigned to 
the locations only or definitions and locations conditions.  
The multivariate result was significant for counseling condition, F (10, 69) 
= 2.384, p < .001; Wilk’s Λ = .413, partial η2 = .255. Univariate tests showed 
there was a significant difference in the number of critical loan terms correctly 
recalled depending on counseling condition, regardless of the scoring method 
used (i.e., strict or lenient). Somewhat consistent with predictions, participants 
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assigned to the no counseling condition recalled significantly fewer critical loan 
terms correctly (m = 2.050) than participants assigned to the definitions and 
locations condition (m = 3.474) under strict scoring, p < .005. Participants 
assigned to the no counseling condition also recalled significantly fewer critical 
loan terms (m = 3.200) than participants assigned to the definitions and locations 
condition (m = 4.368) under lenient scoring, p < .05.  
H4: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will visually fixate 
on fewer critical loan term AOIs than participants assigned to any of the 
counseling conditions (definitions only, locations only, or definitions and 
locations condition).  
H4a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will 
visually fixate on fewer critical loan term AOIs than participants 
assigned to the locations only or definitions and locations conditions.  
There were no significant differences in the number of critical loan term 
AOIs visually fixated on by participants assigned to the definitions only (m = 
5.36), locations only (m = 5.82), definitions and locations (m = 5.84), or no 
counseling condition (m = 5.20), F (3, 78) = .766, p = .517; partial η2 = .029. 
H5: Participants assigned to the no counseling condition will visually fixate 
on critical loan term AOIs for a shorter duration than participants assigned 
to any of the counseling conditions (definitions only, locations only, or 
definitions and locations condition). 
H5a: Participants assigned to the definitions only condition will 
visually fixate on critical loan term AOIs for a shorter duration than 
participants assigned to the locations only or definitions and locations 
conditions.  
There were no significant differences in the duration of critical loan term 
AOI fixations by participants assigned to the definitions only (m = 6.074 
seconds), locations only (m = 5.766 seconds), definitions and locations (m = 
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6.917 seconds), or no counseling condition (m = 6.208 seconds), F (3, 78) = .635, 
p = .594; partial η2 = .024.  
However, univariate tests showed there was a significant difference in the 
duration of fixations on non-critical loan term AOIs depending on the counseling 
condition participants were assigned to. Unexpectedly, but in line with the 
predictions of ELM, participants assigned to the no counseling condition fixated 
on non-critical loan term AOIs for significantly more time (m = 9.698 seconds) 
than participants assigned to the locations only condition (m = 7.079 seconds), p < 
.05 or definitions and locations condition (m = 7.011), p < .05. 
A regression analysis was also used to investigate whether participants’ 
duration of fixations on non-critical loan terms mediated the relationship between 
the amount of counseling participants received and their ratings of loan quality. In 
step one of the mediation model, the regression of counseling (where no 
counseling was coded as 0, definitions counseling was coded as 1, locations 
counseling was coded as 1, and definitions and locations counseling was coded as 
2) on loan quality ratings, ignoring the mediator (duration of fixation on non-
critical terms), was not significant, b = .141, SE = .151, p = .352. In step two, 
regression of counseling on duration of fixation on non-critical loan terms was 
significant, b = -1.356, SE = .453, p < .01, but the regression of fixation duration 
on non-critical loan terms on quality ratings was not statistically significant, b = 
.026, SE = .035, p = .467. In step three, controlling for the mediator (duration of 
fixation on non-critical loan terms), counseling was (still) not a significant 
predictor of quality ratings, b = .196, SE = .037, p = .282. A Sobel test was 
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conducted and found no significant mediation in the model (-.721, SE = .048, p = 
.471).  
Discussion – Experiments 3 and 4 
 In contrast to predictions, there were no significant differences in loan 
quality ratings or willingness to take out the loan by participants assigned to the 
definitions only, locations only, definitions and locations, or no counseling 
condition found in experiments 3 or 4. It is possible that none of the expected 
differences were found because regardless of the condition they were assigned to, 
participants were relatively unmotivated to pay attention to or learn from the 
counseling session. Research shows that when people know or think they know a 
lot about a topic, they are more likely to rely on their default assumptions related 
to that topic and less likely to learn new material (Wood et al., 2002; Stark & 
Choplin, 2010). As the majority of participants in both experiment 3 and 
experiment 4 reported having (or having had) student loans in real life (91% in 
experiment 3; 63% in experiment 4), participants may have assumed they already 
possessed sufficient knowledge related to student loans and did not need to pay 
close attention to the information relayed in the counseling session. Future 
research should examine the impact of pre-loan counseling on the behaviors and 
decision intentions of participants who are true prospective borrowers with 
minimal experience related to student loans.   
In experiment 4, participants assigned to the definitions and locations 
counseling condition did recall significantly more critical loan terms than 
participants who received no loan counseling. This finding suggests that, in line 
50 
 
 
 
with predictions, providing consumers with additional information related to 
critical loan terms during counseling will improve their ability to correctly recall 
the values associated with these loan terms afterwards. In contrast to predictions, 
however, this finding also suggests that providing prospective borrowers with the 
definitions of critical loan terms is as equally as valuable a component of pre-loan 
counseling as providing them with the spatial locations of critical loan terms.  
 Although there were no significant differences in the number of critical 
loan term AOIs visually fixated on or the duration of critical AOI fixations by 
participants in experiment 4, an unexpected finding, but one not inconsistent with 
the predictions of ELM, emerged. Participants assigned to the locations only 
condition and the definitions and locations condition in experiment 4 spent 
significantly less time fixating on non-critical loan terms compared to participants 
who received no counseling. This finding suggests increasing prospective 
borrowers’ awareness of the spatial locations of critical loan terms contained in a 
disclosure will increase the effectiveness of their search pattern, such that they 
will spend less time looking at non-critical loan terms. This could be particularly 
advantageous in a situation where a prospective borrower did not have the luxury 
of unlimited time to review a disclosure form. Although there were no significant 
differences in the duration of fixations on critical loan term AOIs by participants 
assigned to the time pressure condition or no time pressure condition here, future 
research should explore the possibility that spending less time fixated on non-
critical loan terms will lead borrowers to spend more time focusing on critical 
terms.  
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Spending less time focused on non-critical loan terms could also 
theoretically benefit consumers’ evaluations of a loan’s quality. Although 
duration of fixations on non-critical loan terms was not found to be a significant 
mediator of the relationship between counseling and loan quality ratings here, 
future research should examine this possibility.  
General Discussion 
 Here, four experiments testing the predictions of ELM in a fictional 
predatory student lending scenario were presented. While previous research has 
examined the predictions of ELM as they relate to consumer fraud and scams 
from a theoretical perspective (e.g., Rusch, 1999; Whitty, 2013; Langenderfer & 
Shimp, 2001; Lea et al., 2009), this research is, to my knowledge, the first to do 
so empirically.  
Following the predictions of ELM, it was hypothesized in experiments 1 
and 2 that reducing participants’ ability to deeply process the information 
contained in a student loan disclosure form (by subjecting them to time pressure) 
would result in peripheral processing behaviors – i.e., less attention paid to 
decision-relevant information (loan terms) – and peripheral route-related 
persuasion whereby the presence of irrelevant cues related to the credibility of the 
university and university representative would positively influence participants’ 
evaluations of a disadvantageous loan and increase participants’ willingness to 
sign that loan. It was predicted in experiments 3 and 4 that increasing participants’ 
knowledge related to information contained in a student loan disclosure form 
through a pre-loan counseling session would result in increased central processing 
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behaviors, such that participants would evaluate the quality of the loan more 
accurately and report being less willingness to sign the disadvantageous loan. 
Although these predictions were only partially supported, the present 
results offer several valuable insights. First, it was found in experiment 2 that 
subjecting participants to time pressure significantly reduced the number of loan 
terms they fixated on during their review of the disclosure form, the total duration 
of these fixations, and the number of loan terms they were able to correctly recall 
post-loan review. These findings suggest that if prospective borrowers in the real 
world have limited time to review the terms of their loan, they will spend less 
time looking at critical loan terms (i.e, terms critical to a borrower’s ability to 
repay their loan), and be less likely to correctly recall the values of these terms 
afterwards, both of which could prove highly disadvantageous to consumers’ 
decision-making As being in the same room as a prospective borrower gives 
predatory personnel the opportunity to distract or rush these borrowers through 
forms, policy should therefore mandate that borrowers seeking private loans be 
given the opportunity to review and sign loan documents outside the presence of 
institution-affiliated personnel.  
Second, the present findings suggest that even if consumers look at and 
are able to successfully recall the values associated with loan terms, this does not 
mean consumers will have the ability to accurately evaluate how good or bad 
these values are. Although participants assigned to the no time pressure condition 
across experiments 1 and 2 visually fixated on a greater number of loan terms, 
fixated on these terms for a significantly longer duration of time, and recalled 
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significantly more loan terms correctly (in experiment 2) than participants 
assigned to the time pressure condition, there were no significant differences 
found for participants’ ratings of loan quality or willingness to take out the loan. 
Previous research suggests that many consumers lack the necessary background 
knowledge and schemas to comprehend disclosure documents and accurately 
evaluate the “goodness” of included loan terms (Stark & Choplin, 2009; Stark & 
Choplin, 2010). Future research should explore whether providing prospective 
borrowers with the typical and appropriate ranges of loan term values positively 
influences the accuracy of their subsequent evaluations and quality of decision-
making.  
Third, it was found in experiment 4 that providing participants with pre-
loan counseling containing both the definitions and spatial locations of critical 
loan terms contained in the disclosure form increased their ability to recall the 
values associated with these loan terms afterwards. Providing participants with 
the spatial locations of critical terms also resulted in their spending less time 
looking at non-critical terms. Currently, no loan counseling is required for 
borrowers of private student loans, and federal loan counseling does not include a 
section dedicated to the spatial locations of key loan terms contained in a 
disclosure form. The present findings suggest that pre-loan counseling is indeed 
beneficial to prospective student loan borrowers, and thus policy should mandate 
that colleges require all students who wish to receive a private loan to complete 
pre-loan counseling before the loan will be processed (this is already required by 
some universities today including the University of Kansas and University of 
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Iowa). Furthermore, the present findings suggest that it would be advantageous 
for all pre-loan counseling (federal and private) to include: 1) a section dedicated 
to increasing prospective borrowers’ knowledge of the definitions/information 
related to critical loan terms, 2) a section dedicated to increasing prospective 
borrowers’ awareness of where critical loan terms are located in the disclosure 
form, and 3) a section dedicated to increasing prospective borrowers’ 
understanding of how good or bad the values associated with loan terms are, 
potentially by providing the range of appropriate and acceptable values for each 
term.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are several limitations associated with the present research. First, 
there were likely inherent differences in the motivations of participants used in the 
present experiments compared with true prospective student loan borrowers, such 
as those in the ITT Tech case. Given that participants in these studies knew this 
was a fictional scenario and that they would not actually have to decide whether 
or not to sign the proffered loan, they may have been less motivated in general to 
devote effort to the study. As the predictions in the present set of studies were 
developed based on an assumption that participants would imagine themselves 
being true, first generation college students with a high motivation to take out a 
loan, participants failing to do this would be problematic.  
Second, participants used in these studies may not have been an accurate 
representation of the ITT Tech students or those prospective borrowers typically 
targeted by for-profit colleges. Previous research suggests that consumers with 
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less education, low income, and who are ethnic minorities are particularly 
vulnerable to predatory lending (Stark & Choplin, 2010; Agarwal et al., 2006; 
Hong & Bohnet, 2007). We also know that for-profit colleges aim specifically to 
recruit low income, minority, and first-generation college students as these 
borrowers tend to quality for the maximum amount of student aid (Cottom, 2017). 
Across experiments 1 – 4, almost half of participants (48%) self-identified as 
white, 34% identified as Asian, and only 18% identified as either black, 
Hispanic/Latino, Native American, Hawaiian, or ‘other’. The annual incomes 
reported by participants in experiments 1 – 4 were also not considered “low 
income” (MMTurk = $54,750, MDePaul = $100,335). Thus, it may have been difficult 
for many of the participants to take on the mindset of a first-generation college 
student desperate to attend college and create a better life for themselves and their 
family.  
Finally, it is possible that the loan used in the present set of studies was 
manipulated to be too obviously disadvantageous. Participants rated the quality of 
the loan and their willingness to take out the loan as relatively low. The average 
rating of loan quality was 2.86 (where 2 = “bad” and 3 = “neither good nor bad”) 
and the average rating of willingness to take out the loan was 2.71 (where 2 = 
“unwilling” and 3 = “neither willing nor unwilling”). While this relative accuracy 
could be a reflection of participants having the necessary knowledge to effectively 
evaluate the quality of a loan, it could also again be a reflection of limited 
motivation. Considering participants knew this was a fictional scenario, they may 
have deemed it unnecessary to think about alternative reasons to sign the loan 
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(i.e., desperate to create better life for themselves, believed the university 
representative was trustworthy and they would have great job and salary after, 
etc.) once realizing the terms were disadvantageous, whereas these alternate 
reasons may have been considered by true first-generation student loan borrowers.  
Future research should investigate whether manipulating the terms of a 
fictional loan to be less obviously disadvantageous impacts the accuracy of 
participants’ evaluations and decision intentions. For example, if participants saw 
a low initial interest rate, they may base their evaluation of the loan’s quality on 
that rate alone but fail to notice other disadvantageous terms (i.e., high fees, 
adjustable and uncapped interest rate, etc.). 
Conclusion  
The present set of experiments are (to my knowledge) the first to 
empirically test the predictions of ELM in a fraud-related decision context. While 
results only partially supported the predictions of ELM, the present findings 
provide several valuable insights related to mitigating consumers’ risk of falling 
prey to predatory student lending. 
With 44 million student loan borrowers in the U.S. today owing a 
collective $1.48 trillion (Student Loan Hero, 2018), a national student loan 
delinquency rate that is on the rise (Student Loan Hero, 2018), and expectations 
that existing regulations intended to protect student loan borrowers (and for-profit 
borrowers, in particular) from abuse will continue to loosen, it is critical that 
research be dedicated to better understanding prospective student loan borrowers’ 
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behaviors so that strategies to improve decision-making in this crucial context can 
be identified. Using ELM as a framework, researchers can continue to explore the 
factors that exacerbate consumers’ vulnerability to predatory persuasion, and 
policy-makers can design counseling to mitigate this vulnerability and ultimately 
protect consumers from disadvantageous student loan decision-making. 
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Appendix A 
Predictions of ELM illustrated (Kang et al., 2015)
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Appendix B 
Private student loan disclosure form used in experiments 1-4 
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Appendix C 
Areas of Interest created around critical (red) and “other” loan terms (blue) 
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Appendix D 
Locations only counseling condition (Total Loan Amount example) 
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Appendix E 
Definitions and locations counseling condition (Total Loan Amount example). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“This is the total loan amount. 
The total loan amount 
represents…” 
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Table 1 
Experiment 1 Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition Response Variable M SD 
No Time Pressure + No Credibility Cues Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Term Recall (strict) 
Term Recall (lenient) 
 
2.73 
2.45 
6.32 
6.86 
1.162 
1.335 
3.168 
2.916 
No Time Pressure + Credibility Cues Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Term Recall (strict) 
Term Recall (lenient) 
 
2.40 
2.45 
7.40 
8.70 
1.188 
1.234 
2.010 
1.867 
Time Pressure + No Credibility Cues Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Term Recall (strict) 
Term Recall (lenient) 
 
2.23 
2.09 
5.77 
6.41 
1.193 
1.306 
3.085 
3.003 
Time Pressure + Credibility Cues Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Term Recall (strict) 
Term Recall (lenient) 
 
2.93 
2.70 
5.63 
7.04 
1.299 
1.325 
3.053 
3.131 
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Table 2 
Experiment 2 Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition Response Variable M SD 
No Time Pressure + No Credibility Cues Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Term Recall (strict) 
Term Recall (lenient) 
AOI fixations  
AOI fixation duration 
 
2.68 
2.63 
4.11 
5.84 
20.21 
60.78 
.946 
1.212 
2.447 
2.410 
3.155 
28.577 
No Time Pressure + Credibility Cues Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Term Recall (strict) 
Term Recall (lenient) 
AOI fixations 
AOI fixation duration 
 
2.30 
2.10 
4.65 
7.10 
21.35 
77.94 
.979 
1.021 
1.348 
1.804 
2.777 
44.31 
Time Pressure + No Credibility Cues Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Term Recall (strict) 
Term Recall (lenient) 
AOI fixations 
AOI fixation duration 
 
2.90 
2.55 
2.40 
4.45 
11.35 
14.54 
.912 
.946 
1.095 
1.317 
3.083 
2.878 
Time Pressure + Credibility Cues Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Term Recall (strict) 
Term Recall (lenient) 
AOI fixations 
AOI fixation duration 
 
2.80 
2.60 
2.80 
4.70 
11.14 
14.569 
1.152 
1.095 
1.399 
1.593 
2.670 
3.115 
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Table 3 
Experiment 3 Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition Response Variable M SD 
Definitions Only Counseling Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Critical Term Recall (strict) 
Critical Term Recall (lenient) 
 
3.67 
3.72 
3.61 
4.39 
1.188 
1.526 
1.883 
1.944 
Locations Only Counseling Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Critical Term Recall (strict) 
Critical Term Recall (lenient) 
 
3.55 
3.65 
3.60 
4.15 
1.356 
1.565 
.883 
.875 
Definitions & Locations Counseling Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Critical Term Recall (strict) 
Critical Term Recall (lenient) 
 
4.05 
3.84 
4.11 
4.68 
 
1.224 
1.463 
1.595 
1.565 
No Counseling Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Critical Term Recall (strict) 
Critical Term Recall (lenient) 
 
3.35 
3.06 
3.35 
3.94 
 
1.618 
1.713 
1.730 
1.713 
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Table 4 
Experiment 4 Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 
 
 
Condition Response Variable M SD 
Definitions Only Counseling Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Critical Term Recall (strict) 
Critical Term Recall (lenient) 
Critical AOI Fixations 
Critical AOI Fixation Duration (s) 
Non-Critical AOI Fixations 
Non-Critical AOI Fixation Duration (s) 
 
2.36 
2.09 
2.67 
3.52 
5.29 
6.14 
6.52 
7.74 
.658 
1.065 
1.354 
1.327 
2.053 
2.514 
2.28 
3.225 
Locations Only Counseling Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Critical Term Recall (strict) 
Critical Term Recall (lenient) 
Critical AOI Fixations 
Critical AOI Fixation Duration (s) 
Non-Critical AOI Fixations  
Non-Critical AOI Fixation Duration (s) 
 
2.59 
2.41 
2.59 
3.23 
5.82 
5.76 
6.36 
7.08 
1.141 
1.008 
1.182 
1.343 
1.736 
2.551 
1.956 
2.586 
Definitions & Locations 
Counseling 
Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Critical Term Recall (strict) 
Critical Term Recall (lenient) 
Critical AOI Fixations 
Critical AOI Fixation Duration (s) 
Non-Critical AOI Fixations 
Non-Critical AOI Fixation Duration (s) 
 
2.68 
2.63 
3.47 
4.37 
5.84 
6.92 
5.79 
7.01 
.946 
1.116 
1.307 
1.300 
1.803 
3.023 
1.619 
2.716 
No Counseling Quality Rating 
Willingness Rating 
Critical Term Recall (strict) 
Critical Term Recall (lenient) 
Critical AOI Fixations 
Critical AOI Fixation Duration (s) 
Non-Critical AOI Fixations 
Non-Critical AOI Fixation Duration (s) 
 
2.40 
2.45 
2.05 
3.20 
5.20 
6.20 
6.90 
9.70 
.995 
.999 
1.146 
1.152 
1.361 
2.585 
1.410 
2.742 
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